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Kennedy: Introduction

HOFSTRA 1AW REVIEW
Volume 7, No. 1

Fall 1978

SYMPOSIUM ON SENTENCING, PART I
INTRODUCTION
Edward M. Kennedy*
Sentencing in America today is a national scandal. Every day
our system of sentencing breeds massive injustice. Judges are free
to roam at will, dispensing ad hoc justice in ways that defy both
reason and fairness. Different judges mete out widely differing
sentences to similar offenders convicted of similar crimes. 1 There
are no guidelines to aid them in the exercise of their discretion,
nor is there any mechanism for appellate review of sentences.
The current Federal Criminal Code 2 contains no list of criteria
to be considered by the sentencing judge in deciding whether to
impose a term of imprisonment. The result has been chaotic--one
judge may sentence to rehabilitate, another to deter the offender or
potential offenders from future crime, a third to incapacitate,
and a fourth simply to "punish." One judge may place a convicted
defendant on probation, arguing that rehabilitation should never be
a justification for imprisonment; another judge may justify a sentence of prpbation on the ground that "deterrence doesn't work."
The absence in the Federal Criminal Code of articulated purposes
or goals of sentencing has led to sentences based on the particular
sentencing attitudes and beliefs of individual judges and, inevitably,
to wide sentencing disparity.
The judges are not to blame. The great majority of our federal judges try to perform their sentencing duties in a responsible,
diligent manner. But they must act without the assistance of any
standards or review procedures. In fact, the law invites injustice by
* United States Senator from Massachusetts. Senator Kennedy is cosponsor of S.
1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
1. Dershowitz, Background Paper, in TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK
FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 67, 103 (1976).

2. 18 U.S.C. (1976).
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conferring unlimited discretion on judges to impose sentences
within vast statutory limits. For example, a convicted bank robber
can be sentenced anywhere from a term of probation to twenty-five
years in prison, 3 a rapist anywhere from probation to life impris4
onment.
INDETERMINATE SENTENCINGREHABILITATION AND JUDICIAL DIsCRETION

Historically, the judiciary has been provided broad sentencing
discretion in the name of benevolence. The basic argument in support of indeterminate sentencing is that the convicted offender
should be "rehabilitated" before being allowed to reenter society.
Since the pace of rehabilitation varies among individuals, the argument continues, the sentencing judge is not equipped to fix a
definite prison term before the offender starts his treatment. Traditional correctional philosophy says that a rehabilitative "cure" can
best be promoted by tailoring the sentence to fit the personal
needs and characteristics of the offender.
But this approach-noble in purpose and based on the best of
intentions-has backfired dramatically. In the last few years study
after study has documented the nature and scope of sentencing
disparity. 5 The present process results in particularly disparate
treatment of the young and the poor 6 and nurtures a growing public
cynicism about our institutions. The youth who goes for a joyride or
commits a petty larceny is sentenced to a year in jail. On the other
hand, the tax evader, the price fixer, the polluter, or the corrupt
public official often receives a suspended sentence on the irrational
ground that the stigma of conviction is punishment enough.
3. Id. § 2113.
4. Id. § 2031.
5. E.g., Seymour, 1972 Sentencing Study for the Southern District of New

York, 45 N.Y. ST. B.J. 163 (1973); A. Partridge & W. Eldridge, Second Circuit Sentencing Study, A Report to the Judges of the Second Circuit, reprinted in Reform of
the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings on S. 1 and S. 1400 Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
8101, 8104-14 (1974). See also M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES (1973); N. MORIUS,
THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1976).
6. See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY ToWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME 20 (1978); Harris & Dunbaugh, Premise for a Sensible Sentencing Debate: Giving Up Imprisonment, 7
HOFSTRA L. REV. - (1979) (to be published in Symposium on Sentencing, Part
1I, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 243 (1979)); Skrivseth, Abolishing Parole:Assuring Fairness
and Certainty in Sentencing, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. (1979) (to be published in
Symposium on Sentencing, Part II, 7 HOFSTnA L. REV. 243 (1979)).
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The system which produces this disparity appears arbitrary to
society as well as to prisoners. How does one explain that a defendant who is sentenced by a judge to twelve years in prison is
paroled after actually serving just four? How does one justify excessive jail terms for some offenders, while others, who commit the
same crime and have a similar background and record, escape jail
altogether. Certainty of punishment, the cornerstone of an effective
law enforcement policy, does not exist. To all who come in contact
with it, the "system" is seen for what it is: a game of chance in
which offenders play the odds and gamble on avoiding punishment.
When judges do impose identical terms of imprisonment, offenders often are released from confinement arbitrarily, after
serving different proportions of their imposed terms. This is because one offender, having completed all the proper prison education
and counseling programs, is found to be "rehabilitated" by the
parole board while another prisoner, who refuses to take such
courses, is deemed a "poor risk." Correctional experts agree, however, that how a prisoner responds to such prison rehabilitation
programs is not an accurate predictor of how he or she will behave
7
in society once paroled.
Thus parole acts arbitrarily to keep one prisoner jailed while
releasing another. This should not be surprising. Coercive rehabilitation programs too often force the prisoner to make a Hobson's
choice: Reject the programs offered, in which case this apparent
lack of cooperation with the prison authorities assures the prisoner
a longer indeterminate sentence, less likelihood of parole, and less
opportunity for participating in early release or other diversionary
programs; or "go along with the game plan" and pretend to respond to compulsory prison training programs. In the latter case,
"rehabilitation" is little more than a sham to ingratiate the prisoner
with the parole board.
Abolition of prison rehabilitation programs is not the answer. Indeed, such programs should be expanded, especially in the
areas of vocational and educational training.8 What is needed is the
7.

See, e.g., N. MoRms, supra note 5, at 34-36.

8.

Even Robert Martinson, who long held the view that rehabilitative programs
have no appreciable effect on recidivism, see, e.g., Martinson, What Works?Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1974, at 22,
now asserts that this conclusion is incorrect and that some programs are, indeed,
beneficial. See Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding
Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. (1979) (to be published in Symposium
on Sentencing, PartII, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 243 (1979)).
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abolition of compulsory rehabilitation, particularly as a justification
for imprisonment. Forced rehabilitation does not work and can be
manipulated by the parole board as a justification for retaining custody of a prisoner until it determines that he or she is sufficiently
rehabilitated to become a peaceful member of society.
The underlying reason for the lack of success in our correctional system is the absence of rational, fair sentencing practices.
The issue is not whether more offenders should be sentenced to
prison (they should not); nor is it whether prisons should be
abolished and replaced with a wide variety of diversionary programs (we will always need prisons for certain offenders). Certainly,
widespread criticism of our correctional system is justified: Our
prisons are overcrowded and understaffed, and few correctional
programs seem to "cure" criminals of crime. 9 Yet, such criticism is
misdirected. The real issue is determining, with some degree of fairness and uniformity, which offenders belong in prison and which do
not; for those who do, we must assure similar sentences for similar
offenders who commit similar crimes. We must direct our immediate
attention away from the ideological argument of incarceration versus diversion and instead debate the need for improving our sentencing practices.
FEDERAL LEGISLATION: S.

1437

The critical problem of sentencing disparity is met head on for
the first time in the proposed Federal Criminal Code Reform
Act, 10 the most important effort yet undertaken to deal with the
problem of criminal sentencing. The Act is thus the focus of much
of the debate contained in this Symposium.
The Act would restructure and modernize the entire Federal
Criminal Code. Its most important provisions are designed to curb
judicial sentencing discretion, eliminate indeterminate sentences,

9. See Martinson, What Works?--Questions and Answers About Prison Reform,
PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1974, at 22.
10. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). This Introduction deals with §§ 101
and 124 of the bill. Id. §§ 101, 124. Section 101 of the bill, if enacted, will amend
Title 18 of the United States Code regarding, inter alia, sentencing guidelines. All
subsequent textual and footnote references to § 101 of the bill are to the proposed
section numbers in Title 18 of the United States Code, and are hereinafter cited as
Proposed 18 U.S.C. Section 124 of the bill, if enacted, will amend Title 28 of the
United States Code to establish a Sentencing Commission. All subsequent textual
and footnote references to § 124 of the bill are to the proposed section numbers in
Title 28 of the United States Code, and are hereinafter cited as Proposed 28 U.S.C.
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phase out parole release, and make criminal sentencing fairer and
more certain." In the great majority of cases the indeterminate
sentence would be replaced by a requirement that the judge sen12
tence a convicted offender to a fixed period of imprisonment.
The sentencing judge, not the parole board, would determine the
precise sentence that an offender should serve; however, the judge
would sentence within a narrow range of sentencing guidelines, 13
4
fashioned by a permanent Sentencing Commission.'
This guidelines approach is designed to reduce the problem of
sentencing disparity by narrowing the range of permissible judicial
discretion. In determining sentencing guidelines, the Commission
5
would consider: The general criteria spelled out in the statute;'
available sentencing statistics;' 6 and, especially, the various aggra17
vating and mitigating circumstances which affect culpability.
These might include leadership in the criminal enterprise, particularly cruel treatment of the victim, previous record of the offender,
and the degree of coercion imposed on the offender.' 8
If the judge, in a rare case, decides to impose a sentence outside of the guidelines, the reasons for doing so must be explained
on the record, and appellate review to a higher court would fol20
low. 19 This practice is now followed in only a few states.
Given such a system of judicially-fixed sentences, parole release would be gradually abolished, since whether or not prisoners
had been rehabilitated or had completed certain prison courses
would have no bearing on their prison release date. Subject to
slight variations based on prison behavior, 2 ' offenders would know
at the time of initial sentencing by the court what their prison release date would be.

11. See Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 10, §§ 2001-2306; Proposed 28 U.S.C.,
supra note 10, §§ 991-998; text accompanying notes 12-21 infra.
12. Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 10, § 2301(a)-(b).
13. Id. § 2003(a)(2).
14. Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 10, § 994.
15. Id. § 994(b)-(d), (f)-(m).
16. Id. § 994(l).
17. Id. § 994(c)-(d).
18. See id.
19. Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 10, § 3725.
20. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 450.30, 470.13 (McKinney 1971). For a
list of states in which appellate review of sentences is permitted, see Labbe, Appellate Review of Sentences: Penology on the Judicial Doorstep, J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 122, 124-25 (1977).

21. Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 10, § 3824(b).
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THE SYMPOSIUM-DISTILLATION OF THE DEBATE

Sentencing reform-whether it takes the form advocated in
the federal legislation or in some other proposal-will have a pronounced and lasting impact on our criminal justice system. It is,
therefore, important to debate and discuss the benefits and costs of
such reform. Yet sentencing reform is an extraordinarily complex
subject; here lies the importance of these issues of the Hofstra Law
Review. This Symposium is a gathering of the leading authorities
on sentencing, an invaluable resource tool which affords experts
and lay people alike the opportunity to become acquainted with all
aspects of the sentencing controversy.
This is not to say that all participants in the Symposium agree
with each other. Judge Richey, for example, calls for appellate review of sentences, but only on appeal by the defendant. 2 2 While
23
unlimited prosecutorial appeal may have serious implications,
limited government appeal serves an important function. A chief
cause of sentencing disparity can be traced to the unreasonably low
sentences often imposed on white-collar offenders. For example, in
its recent report on white-collar crime, the Subcommittee on Crime
of the House Judiciary Committee points to a 1971 bank failure, involving sixty million dollars, for which the official directly responsible
received a sentence of three years probation and a five thousand
dollar fine.2 4 Moreover, such lenity is not confined to white-collar
crime, but is found equally in the sentences imposed on those convicted of government misconduct: Recently in United States v.
Denson,2 5 three'Texas policemen, who conspired in and were held
responsible for a man's death, were sentenced to one year imprisonment and five years probation. The federal legislation defends
22. Richey, Appellate Review of Sentences: Recommendation for a Hybrid Approach, 7 HoFSTRA L. REV. 71 (1978).
23. For discussion of constitutional issues implicated by prosecutorial appeal,
see Richey, supra note 22, at 78-80, 86.
24. SUBCOMM. ON CRIME OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 95TH
CONG., 2D SESS., WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE PROBLEM AND THE FEDERAL RESPONSE 47 (Comm. Print 1978).

25.

No. 77-107 (S.D. Tex., Mar. 28, 1977), appeal dismissed, writ of mandamus

denied, 588 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1979). Defendants were convicted pursuant to 18
U.S.C. §§ 241-242 (1976). The maximum term provided by each of these provisions is
life imprisonment. Upon the district court's resolution of the case, the Government
petitioned the Fifth Circuit on two bases: (1) It appealed the sentence of probation,
challenging its legality; and (2) it sought a writ of mandamus ordering the trial judge

to correct the allegedly illegal sentence. United States v. Denson, 588 F.2d 1112,
1114 (5th Cir. 1979). Although finding the sentence of probation illegal, the court
maintained that Government has no right to direct appeal of sentence. Id. at 1126-27.
The writ of mandamus was also rejected. Id. at 1133.
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against such results by providing for government appeal, but only
of sentences imposed below the Commission guidelines.2 6
Professor Tonry examines the composition of a Federal Sen27
tencing Commission and its role in creating sentencing guidelines.
Arguably, the legislature rather than a commission could set presumptive sentence ranges. In fact, a number of states have adopted
this approach. 28 However, as Professor Tonry ably demonstrates, this
task is best performed by an independent body of professionals
rather than a politically responsive legislature. 2 9
Professor Orland criticizes the determinate sentencing movement. 30 He perceptively explores the major weaknesses in several
state sentencing reform packages and notes that S. 1437 avoids most
of these problems. For example, he observes that the goal of S. 1437
is to prevent incarceration of an offender for the sole purpose of
rehabilitation. 3 ' However, it is important to note that the bill does
not eliminate rehabilitation as a consideration in sentencing. 32
This is a significant and often overlooked distinction which Judges
Lasker3 3 and Tyler3 4 also recognize in their cogent and important
articles. Moreover, Professor Orland recognizes that S. 1437 contains
a statutory requirement that good time must "vest," 3 5 thus alleviating
much of the arbitrariness which he finds present in a number of new
state sentencing codes. 36
Professor Orland does argue that the maximum terms of imprisonment under S. 143737 are excessive. 38 However, the proposed federal code mandates that the Sentencing Commission develop guidelines based on the average sentences currently imposed and
26. Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 10, § 3725(b).
27. Tonry, The Sentencing Commission in Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA
L. REv. (1979) (to be published in Symposium on Sentencing, Part II, 7
HOFSTRA L. REV. 243 (1979)).

28. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170-.6 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
29. See Tonry, supra note 27.
30. See Orland, From Vengeance to Vengeance: Sentencing Reform and the
Demise of Rehabilitation,7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 29 (1978).
-31. Id. at 47. See Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 10, § 994(j).
32. Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 10, § 101(b)(4).
33. Lasker, PresumptionAgainst Incarceration,7 HOFSTRA L. REv. (1979)
(to be published in Symposium on Sentencing, Part II, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 243
(1979)).
34. Tyler, Sentencing Guidelines: Control of Discretion in Federal Sentencing,
7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 18 (1978).
35. Orland, supra note 30, at 45. See Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 10, §
3824(b).
36. Orland, supra note 30, at 44-46.
37. Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 10, § 2301(b)(1)-(4).
38. Orland, supra note 30, at 40.
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by the length of prison terms actually being served. 39 Sentences
under the Commission's guidelines thus should be substantially less
than the maxima set by the bill. In addition, it is significant that
S. 1437 contains a statutory presumption against incarceration for
40
certain offenders.
Both Judge Bazelon and Professor Orland express concern that
the proposed legislation shifts discretion from the court to the
prosecutor. 4 1 In response, I can only second a point made by
Judge Tyler, former federal judge and Deputy Attorney General of
the United States, who understands the political realities attending
the drafting of a new Federal Criminal Code: "[We must start somewhere to shape discretion in the criminal justice system-and the
most accessible, effective, and significant place to begin is with the
42
sentencing function of the courts."
It is hard to disagree with many of the conclusions reached in
the articles by coauthors Kay Harris and Frank Dunbaugh 4 3 and
by Judge Bazelon."4 Certainly, long range steps must be taken to
eliminate crime from our society; and our prison system is a disaster. But to argue "no sentencing reform until society is reformed"
is to direct attention away from the significant steps government
can take now to make the criminal justice system fairer and more
equitable.
Much of what is said by Andrew von Hirsch4 5 and by coauthors Peter Hoffman and Michael Stover, 4 6 concerning the
need for sentencing reform to reduce disparity, must be seconded
by all. However, I disagree with Hoffman and Stover in one important respect: the future of the parole release function. The limitations inherent in any attempt to reduce disparity through the vehi39.

Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 10,

§

994(l). However, the Commission

need not follow this procedure if it "determines that such a length of term of imprisonment does not adequately reflect a basis for a sentencing range that is consistent
with the purposes of sentencing described [elsewhere in S. 1437]." Id.
40. Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 10, § 994(i).
41. Bazelon, Missed Opportunities in Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV.
57, 68 (1978); Orland, supra note 30, at 43-44.
42. Tyler, supra note 34, at 20 n.45.
43. See Harris & Dunbaugh, Premise for a Sensible Sentencing Debate: Giving
Up Imprisonment, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. (1979) (to be published in Symposium
on Sentencing, PartII, 7 HOFSTA L. REV. 243 (1979)).
44. See Bazelon, supra note 41, at 58-59.
45. See Von Hirsch, Book Review, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. (1979) (to be published in Symposium on Sentencing, Part 11, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 243 (1979)).
46. See Hoffrnan & Stover, Reform in the Determination of Prison Terms:
Equity, Determinacy, and the Parole Release Function, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89
(1978).
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cle of the parole board are well pointed out by Karen Skrivseth. 47
Sentencing reform, at least of the type envisaged in the federal
legislation, simply cannot succeed if the parole release function is
retained. Whatever the limited benefits in allowing a parole board
the power to release offenders, disparity is promoted by the likelihood of judges ignoring sentencing guidelines in an effort to
second-guess the parole board's release date determination. The result is likely to be the opposite of that intended by those who advocate
retention of parole release-an actual increase in sentence length.
Furthermore, I have already questioned whether a parole board's
function should include authority to alter sentences based on a
finding of rehabilitation. Certainly, power to release some prisoners
due to factors such as prison overcrowding creates even more
egregious problems of disparity.
But the goal of this Symposium is not to secure agreement;
rather it is to enlighten the current national debate and to set forth
various proposed reforms. These articles-and the others by Kenneth Flaxman; 4 8 coauthors Brian Forst, William Rhodes, and
Charles Wellford; 49 Robert Martinson; 50 Robert Pugsley; 5 1 and Ernest van den Haag 52 -impressively meet this challenge. There is,
moreover, one point on which all contributors agree: Certain steps
toward concrete sentencing reform must be taken now; too long
have we lived with the system as it stands.
47. Skrivseth, Abolishing Parole: Assuring Fairness and Certainty in Sentenc(1979) (to be published in Symposium on Sentencing,
ing, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. Part 1H, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 243 (1979)).
48. Fla'xman, The Hidden Dangers of Sentencing Guidelines, 7 HOFSTRA L.
REv. (1979) (to be published in Symposium on Sentencing, Part II, 7 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 243 (1979)).
49. Forst, Rhodes & Wellford, Sentencing and Social Science: Research for the
Formulation of Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. - (1979) (to
be published in Symposium on Sentencing, Part H1, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 243 (1979)).
50. Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sen(1979) (to be published in Symposium on
tencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. Sentencing, PartII, 7 HOFSTBA L. REv. 243 (1979)). See note 8 supra.
51. Pugsley, Retributivism: A Just Basisfor Criminal Sentences, 7 HOFSTRA L.
(1979) (to be published in Symposium on Sentencing, Part H1, 7 HOFSTRA
REV. L. RFv. 243 (1979)).

52. Van den Haag, Punitive Sentences, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 123 (1978).
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